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I. INTRODUCTION
Internal Revenue Code § 7430 authorizes the IRS and federal courts
to award attorneys' fees to taxpayers who prevail against the United
States when the IRS fails to establish that its position in an
administrative or court proceeding is substantially justified.' Although
accurate, the foregoing description is misleading. It suggests recovering
fees from the government is all but a formality once a taxpayer has
defeated the United States in an administrative proceeding or litigation.
In reality, upon prevailing against the United States, taxpayers
requesting an award of attorneys' fees may learn that sometime between
receipt of the 30-Day Letter and the conclusion of the proceeding the
taxpayer inadvertently failed to comply with just one of 7430's
numerous procedural requirements and is now ineligible for an award of
fees. Should the taxpayer successfully navigate 7430's procedural
obstacle course, the taxpayer may nonetheless be disqualified from an
award of attorneys' fees and costs for reasons inconsistent with the
purpose of the statute; or the taxpayer may learn that 7430 reduces
"substantially justified" to a mere term of art, or that 7430's cap on the
attorney's rate used for calculating an award of fees is but a fraction of
the rate the taxpayer paid his sophisticated tax attorney. 2
Despite section 7430's shortcomings, Congress was nonetheless
well-intentioned in enacting section 7430 "to deter abusive actions or
overreaching by the [IRS] and to enable taxpayers to vindicate their
rights regardless of their economic circumstances. 3 And although 7430
is a radical departure from the dark days governed by sovereign
immunity 4 and the American Rule,5 in practice 7430 falls far short of
1. I.R.C. § 7430(a) (2000).
2. Id.
3. See Dixon v. Comm'r, 132 T.C. No. 5 (citing Cooper v. United States, 60 F.3d
1529, 1530 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Weiss v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1036, 1041 (1987)));
Huffman v. Comm'r, 978 F.2d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 1992), affg in part and rev'g in
part 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2289 ( 91,144 PH memo TC); Zinniel v. Comm'r, 883 F.2d
1350, 1360 (7th Cir. 1989) (Will, J., dissenting), affg 89 T.C. 357 (1987); In re
Testimony of Arthur Anderson & Co., 832 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1987); Weiss v.
Comm'r, supra at 1041 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-404, at 11 (1981)).
4. The doctrine of sovereign immunity instructs that the United States may not be
sued, nor its funds expended, without explicit congressional authorization.
5. Generally, the "American Rule" provides that each party must bear its own
legal expenses. See Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Awards of Attorney's Fees
Against the Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 738-40 (1993) (citing cases and
LR.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
serving as the check on the IRS that it is purported to be.
This Article will provide history and context for analyzing the
current section 7430. This Article also provides guidance to taxpayers
and their advisors navigating current section 7430's procedural require-
ments while also (i) identifying those instances where section 7430 fails
to implement congressional intent and (ii) proposing remedial
legislation.
II. THE HISTORY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDS AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES IN TAX LITIGATION
The doctrine of sovereign immunity and the American Rule, which
provides that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser,",6 had traditionally combined to
prevent American taxpayers from recovering attorneys' fees from the
Internal Revenue Service. Congress began limiting the United States
government's sovereign immunity in 1972 by amending the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to permit fee awards against the United States in limited
circumstances.7 In 1980, Congress marked an unprecedented departure
from notions of governmental impunity by enacting the Equal Access to
Justice Act ("EAJA").8 The EAJA made the United States susceptible
to fee awards under common law theories and in all civil actions brought
by or against the United States. There were two exceptions, however:
most torts and tax cases.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act
of 19769 and the EAJA initiated what has become the American legal
system's broadening embrace of fee-shifting to the detriment of the
United States government.' ° The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of
discussing the traditional American Rule of attorneys' fees).
6. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)(1972).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988); Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980) (Congress,
by enacting the EAJA, intended "to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of,
or defending against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an award
of attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other costs against the United States.").
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
10. Congress has incrementally increased the availability of attorneys' fees against,
the federal government through various statutes. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5 (1972) (permitting the award of attorneys' fees against the
government and amended in 1991 to expressly waive the government's sovereign
immunity); see also The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205
2010
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1976, and then the EAJA, only authorized awards of attorneys' fees in
tax litigation in federal district courts and the Court of Federal Claims,"
which host only a nominal portion of tax litigation. Despite such
restrictions, the EAJA undoubtedly motivated Congress to allow awards
of attorneys' fees to tax litigants who prevail against the United States in
court. With the 1982 enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act (TEFRA), 12 Congress expanded attorneys' fee
awards to tax litigation in all federal courts. TEFRA specifically granted
the Tax Court statutory authority to award attorneys' fees by introducing
Internal Revenue Code § 7430.13 Section 7430 now authorizes both the
Internal Revenue Service and federal courts to award attorneys' fees,
administrative costs and litigation costs 4 to prevailing parties (other
than the federal government) in tax-related litigation.
Although section 7430's enactment and subsequent amendments15
marked a pro-taxpayer sea change, courts rarely awarded attorneys' fees
to taxpayers under section 7430 prior to 1998. There were a variety of
explanations for the previous dearth of attorneys' fee awards to
(treating the government as a private person for the purposes of attorneys' fee awards);
The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1998) (providing that the government
shall be treated as a private person for the purposes of fee awards); The Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(e) (1998) (stating that courts may impose
attorneys' fees and other litigation costs against the federal government); The Privacy
Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1974) (using language identical to the Freedom of
Information Act to permit awards of attorneys' fees for violations of the Act); The
Government-in-the-Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (1998) (having substantially
identical language to the Freedom of Information Act). The Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 and The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642, among other
environmental protection statutes, generally provide provisions permitting attorneys'
fee awards against the federal government.
11. See McQuiston v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 807, 811-12 (1982) (holding that neither
the EAJA nor the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 authorize the Tax
Court to award attorneys' fees).
12. See The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (adding section 7430 to the Internal Revenue Code).
13. I.R.C. § 7430 (1998). See Debra A. Chini, The 1988 Amendment to 26 U.S.C.
section 7430: Expanding Taxpayers' Rights to Recover Costs in Tax Controversies, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1711, 1718 (1989) (describing the original 26 U.S.C. § 7430).
14. See I.R.C. § 7430(c) (1998) (defining the terms "attorneys' fees," "litigation
costs," and "administrative costs").
15. Congress amended section 7430 eight times following its enactment in 1982.
The most recent amendment was in 2000.
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prevailing tax litigants. Most notably: tax practitioners1 6 were generally
unfamiliar with the statute; the law included complex timing deadlines;
onerous procedural requirements favoring the IRS; courts were uncertain
as to whether pro se attorneys were entitled to receive fees; 17 there was
no provision permitting compensation for pro bono services; and there
was a nominal, hourly-rate cap on attorneys' fees awards. "
In response to common public perception of the IRS as a purveyor
of fear and intimidation, Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 ("Reform Act"). 19 The Reform
Act was an effort to recast the IRS as a customer service oriented
governmental agency and infuse the perception of fairness into the tax
collection process. It did so by equipping taxpayers with additional
rights and remedies. 20  The Reform Act made several significant pro-
taxpayer modifications to section 7430,21 including:
16. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2009) (The term "tax practitioners" is defined in Treasury
Department Circular No. 230 to include, accountants, lawyers, enrolled agents and
enrolled actuaries who are admitted to practice before both the Internal Revenue
Service and Tax Court).
17. Brett Barenholtz, Fees for the Taxpaying Fool: LR. C. section 7430 Fee Awards
to Pro Se Attorneys, 38 CASE W. RES. 408, 422 (1988).
Judicial opinions provide significant authority in evaluating section 7430 and the
validity of pro se attorney fee awards. Since both the Frisch and McPherson cases
involve matters of first impression for their respective courts, no binding precedent
exists. However, other cases do exist which address pertinent aspects of awarding pro
se attorney fees. First, there are cases that apply other statutory fee award provisions.
Some award fees to pro se attorneys, while others deny them. Still other cases that do
not involve pro se attorneys offer general guidelines. Second, there are cases that
apply section 7430 in other contexts. A review of pertinent case law provides
numerous guidelines and extensive consideration of the issues.
Id.
18. The hourly rate initially authorized by I.R.C. § 7430 (c)(1)(A)(ii)(fI) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985) as amended in Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1551(c),
100 Stat. 2085, 2752, was $75. The maximum hourly rate for fees paid or incurred in
2009 is $180. Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107.
19. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
20. Win. Brian Henning, Reforming the IRS: The Effectiveness of the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 82 MARQ. L. REv. 405, 405-06
(1999) ("The Reform Act purports to comprehensively reform the IRS, making it more
user-friendly and more accountable to taxpayers. Additionally, the Reform Act is
intended to enhance the fairness of the tax collection process, solve the problems
created by the complicated code, and restore public confidence in the way the IRS
enforces the code.").
21. The Department of the Treasury issued proposed treasury regulations on
November 25, 2009 to conform the section 7430 regulations to the Taxpayer Relief Act
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(i) providing for recovery of reasonable administrative costs
retroactive to the first letter of proposed deficiency (30-day letter)
that permitted the taxpayer an opportunity for administrative review
with the IRS Appeals Office;
2 2
(ii) raising the hourly rate cap to the amount provided in the EAJA; 23
(iii) expanding the circumstances authorizing awards to exceed the
hourly rate cap;24
(iv) considering IRS defeats in other judicial circuits as a factor
relevant to determining whether the IRS position is substantially
justified; 25
(v) allowing pro bono representatives to recover fees; 26 and
(vi) imposing a rule awarding litigation and administrative costs
when the IRS rejects a taxpayer's qualified offer but later recovers
less than the taxpayer's offer.
27
Although the Reform Act remarkably broadened taxpayers' rights
under section 7430, the Act and subsequent amendments to 7430
remain short of amounting to the deterrent to IRS abusive practices and
overreaching that Congress intended. This Article simplifies 7430's
complex procedural requirements. In doing so, the following discussion
will illustrate that Congress should revisit section 7430 once more.
Congress should align the IRS's incentives to contest the awards of
attorneys' fees and litigation costs with the merits of a particular claim.
III. THE IRS EXAMINATION PROCESS
Before analyzing post-Reform Act section 7430 in further detail, a
concise review of the relevant administrative and judicial process for
resolving tax controversies follows.
of 1997 and the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Proposed regulations are
published for public comment and testimony and do not become operative treasury
regulations until after the public comment period when they may be issued as final
regulations.
22. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2)(B) (2006).
23. Id. § 7430(c)(2); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 3101 (1998).
24. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).
25. Id. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iii).
26. Id. § 7430(c)(3)(B).
27. Id. § 7430(c)(4)(E).
LR. C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
A. The IRS Examination and 30-Day Letter
The Internal Revenue Service conducts tax return examinations
either by a correspondence examination, office audit, or field
examination. Its chosen method(s) vary depending on the issues and the
type of taxpayer involved. If the IRS examination proposes changes to
the taxpayer's return, the examining agent will prepare a "revenue
agent's report" containing the agent's findings and the respective
positions of the taxpayer and the IRS. The IRS then sends the report
with a transmittal letter to the taxpayer stating that the taxpayer has 30
days within which to notify the IRS whether the taxpayer will accept or
appeal the proposed adjustments set forth in the report. The letter, and
the accompanying report, are commonly referred to as the "30-day
letter., 28 The letter informs the taxpayer of their right to challenge the
proposed adjustments, describes the taxpayer's appeal rights and grants
the taxpayer 30 days within which to protest the IRS determination and
request a hearing (i.e., conference) before the IRS Appeals Office. The
taxpayer may request a hearing orally or in writing, depending on the
type of examination involved 29 and the total amount of proposed tax,
proposed over-assessment, claimed refund or, if an offer in compromise,
the total amount contested.3°
B. IRS Appeals Office Conference
Taxpayers may, but are not required to request an administrative
hearing with the IRS Appeals Office. The Appeals Office is separate
and independent of the IRS examination function. It is the only level of
appeal within the IRS. Generally, Appeals Office conferences are con-
ducted informally. The taxpayer or his representative meet with the IRS
appeals officer to exchange information and documents, and discuss the
disputed issues without complying with formal rules of evidence or
28. See KEVIN E. MuRPHY & MARK HIGGENS, CONCEPTS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 24
(16th ed. 2009) (Although the Internal Revenue Service issues different types of 30-day
letters, Letter 525 is presently the "general" 30-day letter the IRS sends taxpayers).
29. See Treas. Reg. § 601.105(c)(1)(i) & (ii) (as amended in 1987) (permitting an
Appeals Office conference upon the taxpayer's request without the submission of a
formal written request after a correspondence or office examination).
30. See id. § 601.105(c)(2) (providing that after a field examination a written
request is not required unless the amount in controversy exceeds $2,500, in which case
a brief written statement of the issues disputed is required. If the amount exceeds
$10,000, a formal written protest is required.).
2010
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judicial procedure. The appeals officer has the authority to settle all
issues of fact and law, and most importantly, to settle the case based on
the "hazards of litigation." Whether a taxpayer decides to request an
appeal depends upon a variety of factors such as the continued deferral
of taxes, taxpayer liquidity issues, the informality of the proceedings,
and the costs and expenses associated with litigation.
If the taxpayer does not request an administrative appeal, the tax-
payer will not be deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies
as required to recover fees and costs under section 7430.
C. Tax Disputes in Judicial Proceedings
If the taxpayer either fails to file a protest and request an Appeals
Office hearing, or is unable or unwilling to settle the case with the
Appeals Office, the IRS will issue a notice of deficiency to the
taxpayer.31 The taxpayer has two options 32 if the IRS issues a notice of
deficiency. The taxpayer, within 90 days from the date that the IRS
issues the notice of deficiency, 33 either may pay the contested tax and
file a claim for refund, or file a petition with the Tax Court.34
If the taxpayer pays the tax and files a claim for refund, the IRS
may grant or deny the claim in whole or in part. If the IRS denies the
claim for refund, or does not act upon the claim for refund within six
months from the filing of the claim, the taxpayer may file suit for a tax
31. I.R.C. § 6212 (2006). If the IRS determines there is a deficiency of income,
estate, gift, or certain miscellaneous excise taxes, the law authorizes the IRS to send a
notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer by certified or registered mail. The notice of
deficiency is not an assessment of tax. Rather, it is a proposed deficiency and gives the
taxpayer 90 days (150 days if the notice is mailed to an address outside the United
States) to either agree to the deficiency or file a petition with the United States Tax
Court for a redetermination of the deficiency, but once the notice of deficiency is
issued, the 90- or 150-day period cannot be suspended or extended. See id. § 6213(a).
The notice of deficiency can be rescinded under certain circumstances if both parties
agree. See id. § 6212. The notice of deficiency is also known as the "90-day letter."
32. I.R.C. § 6213 (2006). The taxpayer, of course, may do nothing. In that case,
the IRS will assess the additional tax liability set forth in the notice of deficiency. The
taxpayer would still have the option of paying the tax assessed, however, and filing a
claim for refund.
33. Id. The Reform Act requires the IRS to include on each notice of deficiency
the actual date by which the taxpayer must file such a petition. Any petition filed on or
before the date specified is considered timely. This change is applicable to all notices
of deficiency mailed after December 31, 1998.
34. Id.
2 R.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
refund in either the United States District Court or the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims.
The conduct of tax proceedings before the U. S. Tax Court, United
States District Court, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims is pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rules of Practice and Procedure of
each court.
IV. SECTION 7430 AND THE REFORM ACT'S EXPANSION
A. Analysis of section 7430
(1) Generally
Section 7430 authorizes the award of reasonable litigation 35 and
administrative costs, 36 including attorneys' fees, reasonable expert
witness fees, and other costs incurred "in connection with the deter-
mination, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty...
under the Internal Revenue Code. Attorneys' fees claimed by non-
lawyers are permitted if the individuals are authorized to practice before
the IRS, but their fees are subject to the same limitations as those
imposed upon attorneys' fee awards.
39
(2) Who is the "Prevailing Party"?
The determination that the taxpayer is the "prevailing party" in a
dispute with the IRS is essential for the taxpayer to be awarded
35. I.R.C. § 7430(a)(2) (2006).
36. Id. § 7430(a)(i).
37. Id. § 7430(a).
38. Id.
39. See id. § 7430(c)(3)(A) (providing that "attorneys' fees" includes fees for the
services of an individual-whether or not an attorney-who is authorized to practice
before either the Tax Court or the IRS); see also IRS Litigation Guideline
Memorandum TL-12 (Rev.), In re Litigation and Administrative Costs Awards under
I.R.C. § 7430 (Dec. 14, 1990) (stating that litigation costs for services provided by
individuals not admitted to practice before the Tax Court may be recovered under only
three circumstances: (1) the individual works for or at the direction of a person who is
admitted to practice before the Tax Court; (2) the individual is an expert witness; or (3)
the individual engages in any study, analysis, engineering report, test or project that is
necessary for the preparation of the case).
2010
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attorneys' fees. 40 A prevailing party41 is any party to a proceeding to
which section 7430 applies that "has substantially prevailed with regard
to the amount in controversy," or "with respect to the most significant
issues or set of issues presented.,
4 1
The determination of whether a party is a "prevailing party" with
respect to the "amount in controversy" 43 is made by agreement between
the parties, or where a final determination is made by a court, then the
court makes the determination.44 The IRS determines which party is the
prevailing party when disputes are resolved at the administrative level.45
Taxpayers are permitted to appeal the IRS decision to grant or deny
attorney fees and administrative costs by filing a petition for review with
the Tax Court.46 Although the IRS may unilaterally award attorneys'
fees in a proceeding to which it is a party at the administrative level, the
Tax Court is the ultimate authority as to whether the IRS is the
prevailing party at the administrative level.
A taxpayer may be the prevailing party as to: (a) the amount in
controversy; (b) the most significant issue or set of issues in the case; or
(c) both. If the taxpayer does not substantially prevail as to the amount
in controversy, the taxpayer may still qualify as a prevailing party if he
substantially prevails on the most significant issue or set of issues
presented. 47 Although permitting taxpayers to recover on either basis
enhances the likelihood of the taxpayer's recovering attorney's fees, the
court's determination as to which issue is the most significant is
subjective. Nonetheless, treasury regulations promulgated under section
7430 explain that an issue or set of issues means the most significant
issue, or set of issues, presented. Each issue's impact by dollar amount,
relative to the amount contested in the preceding, is an objective means
of determining the most significant issue or set of issues before the
40. I.R.C. § 7430(a) (2006).
41. See id. § 7430(c)(4)(A) (expressly excluding the United States and creditors
from the definition of "prevailing party").
42. Id. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
43. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-5(d) (as amended in 1997) (providing that the
amount in controversy is determined at the administrative proceeding and is increased
by any amounts subsequently placed in issue by any party).
43. Id. § 301.7430-5(e).
44. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(C)(ii) (2006).
45. Id. § 7430(c)(4)(C)(i).
46. Id. § 7430(f)(2); TAX CTR. 230-233.
47. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-5(e) (as amended in 1997).
LR.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
court.4 8 Differences in dollar amount by issue may occur when the reso-
lution of an issue or set of issues impacts the taxpayer's or related
parties' other transactions or taxable years.49
A taxpayer will not be treated as the prevailing party, however, if:
(a) the government establishes that its position was "substantially
justified;" 50
(b) the taxpayer fails to meet the statutory net worth requirement;
5 1
(c) the taxpayer does not exhaust its administrative remedies; or
(d) the taxpayer protracts the administrative or judicial proceedings.
Each of these exceptions to fee-shifting provisions is evaluated in
turn.
(a) Is the Government Position "Substantially Justified"
A prevailing party will not be entitled to an award of administrative
and litigation costs to the extent the government establishes that its
position in administrative proceedings and litigation was "substantially
justified.,5 2  The IRS generally asserts that its position will be sub-
stantially justified if it has a reasonable basis in both law and fact or is
justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.53
The IRS position is presumed to be without substantial justification
if its position in the administrative proceeding is inconsistent with
published guidance, including treasury regulations, revenue rulings,
private letter rulings, revenue procedures, technical advice memoranda,
information releases, or determination letters issued as to the specific
taxpayer.5 4 An IRS concession of a case, however, does not constitute a
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i) (2006).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (2006).
52. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i) (2006).
53. I.R.S. Manual § 35.10.1.1.1(2) (Aug. 11, 2004).
54. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iv) (2006). H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 37 (1996),
provides that only the most current version of the enumerated IRS published guidance
as determined at the date the IRS position was taken will be considered for the purposes
of this rule. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-5(h) (as amended in 1997), Example 1, provides
that for each cost for which the taxpayer seeks an award, the question of substantial
justification is determined as of the date the cost was incurred.
2010
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finding that its position was not justified."
To prevent the IRS practice of manufacturing substantial
justification by "circuit shopping," the Reform Act included a new
provision5 6 that expressly instructs courts to consider whether the United
States has lost on substantially similar issues in other judicial circuits
when determining whether the position of the United States was
substantially justified.17 Several appellate courts have provided instruc-
tions for determining when an IRS position is or was substantially
justified. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that the determination as to
whether the IRS position is substantially justified is a case-by-case,
facts-and-circumstances determination.5 8 Another court suggested that a
position is substantially justified if the justification for the position could
satisfy a reasonable person. 9  A Tax Court memorandum opinion
instructed that the IRS position is judged based on whether it was
reasonable in light of its "legal and factual moorings. The Fourth
Circuit held in determining whether the Service's position is
substantially justified, that the "mistakenness" of the determination
should not be confused with the "reasonableness" of the determination. 61
55. See, e.g., TSA/Stanford Assoc., Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 F.3d 490 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding the IRS concession did not automatically warrant attorneys' fees, and the IRS
position was not substantially unjustified when (i) it conceded significant substantive
issues and (ii) three of four trial court decisions contrary to the IRS position were on
appeal during the deficiency proceeding, and the fourth was decided less than a month
prior to the IRS's concession, and one court of appeals held in favor of the IRS on the
issue).
56. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(iii) (2006).
57. In applying the new rule enacted by the Reform Act, a New York Federal
District Court held that where the Service ignored a precedent from another circuit
seeking to gain a split amongst the circuits and to create an appellate vehicle, the IRS
position was not substantially justified. See Gateway Equip. Corp. v. United States, 247
F. Supp. 2d 299 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). See also Allbrittone v. Comm., 37 F.3d 183 (5th
Cir. 1994) (Prior to the 1998 amendment, the Fifth Circuit invited taxpayers to file an
application upon their own initiative when considering the question of substantial
justification. The court reasoned the IRS' actions constituted no more than "circuit
shopping.").
58. See Kenagy v. United States, 942 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1991) (providing examples
of circumstances which might result in a determination that the IRS's position might not
be reasonable such as the failure to adequately investigate its case, or placing
unwarranted reliance on biased witnesses).
59. Info. Res., Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1993).
60. Guyan Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1988).
61. United States v. Little, 104 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 1996).
LR.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the Tax Court, appeared to give greater
latitude to the IRS by stating that its position may be substantially
justified, yet be capricious, arbitrary and without sound basis in fact.62
Considering the foregoing rulings, neither Congress nor the federal
courts have offered a bright-line test for determining whether the IRS
position is substantially justified. But one thing is certain-the prevailing
party will not be entitled to an award of administrative and litigation
costs associated with those issues if the court determines the IRS
position is substantially justified. 63
As the foregoing indicates, the moment at which the government
established its position is significant. When measuring section 7430
litigation costs, the "position of the United States" is the government's
position stated in its answer to the taxpayer's petition filed in court.64
The government's position as to administrative costs is the IRS position
determined on the earlier of (a) the date that the taxpayer receives a
notice of decision from the IRS Appeals Office,65 or (b) the date of the
notice of deficiency.66 Section 7430 grants the IRS substantial latitude
to change its section 7430 position. In fact, section 7430 does not
impose any requirement that the government's position bear even a
remote resemblance to the IRS position in the 30-day letter.
The practical result is that if the IRS determines that it made an
error or that its theory challenging the taxpayer's position is weak at the
administrative level, the IRS may simply refrain from taking a position.
For instance, when the diligent taxpayer resolves a tax dispute with the
IRS at the administrative level, i.e. following the IRS' issuance of a
claim disallowance letter, the IRS does not issue a notice of deficiency
nor is the IRS required to take a position. As the Tax Court explains in a
2007 Tax Court Memorandum, taxpayers
who do a good job at the administrative level of resolving issues and
getting the [Internal Revenue Service] to realize the error of [its]
ways are precluded from recovering administrative costs incurred in
achieving those favorable results. To the contrary, taxpayers who do
62. Mid-Del Therapeutic Ctr. Inc. v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 894 (2000), affid,
89 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-1106 (10th Cir. 2002).
63. Id. Note, however, that whether the government's positions in the
administrative and litigation proceedings were substantially justified is not relevant for
an award under the qualified offer rule.
64. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7)(A) (2006).
65. Id. § 7430(c)(7)(B)(i).
66. Id. § 7430(c)(7)(B)(ii).
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not do as good a job at the administrative level and who receive
adverse Appeals Office notices of decision or notices of deficiency,
but who later convince respondent to concede issues or who
substantially prevail in litigation on the issues, are able to seek a
recovery of administrative costs. In effect, taxpayers who do a better
job at the administrative level of resolving issues raised by
respondent on audit are prejudiced in their ability to recover
administrative costs under section 7430.67
As the Tax Court's reasoning demonstrates, Congress' narrow
drafting of section 7430 undermines Congress' statutory intent by
punishing taxpayers who were subject to improper IRS conduct, but who
diligently, effectively and efficiently resolved their dispute with the IRS,
and section 7430 thereby permits the IRS a back door out of any
obligation to pay attorneys' fees to the taxpayer.
The Reform Act's congressional history indicates that Congress
elected not to determine the IRS position at the issuance of the 30-day
letter. 68  By foregoing the opportunity to put some teeth into section
7430 with the Reform Act, Congress' decision not to do so demon-
strated a lack of understanding or lack of commitment to section 7430's
guiding principle "to deter abusive actions and overreaching by the
[IRS] and to enable taxpayers to vindicate their rights regardless of their
economic circumstances. 69
67. Kwestel v. Comm'r, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1288 (2007).
Under the narrow statutory language of section 7430(c)(7) as written, under
respondent's interpretative regulation under section 7430 . . . and under the
interpretation placed thereon by the referenced court cases, taxpayers (such as
petitioners herein) who do a good job at the administrative level of resolving issues
and getting respondent to realize the error of his ways are precluded from recovering
administrative costs incurred in achieving those favorable results. To the contrary,
taxpayers who do not do as good a job at the administrative level and who receive
adverse Appeals Office notices of decision or notices of deficiency, but who later
convince respondent to concede issues or who substantially prevail in litigation on the
issues, are able to seek a recovery of administrative costs. In effect, taxpayers who do
a better job at the administrative level of resolving issues raised by respondent on
audit are prejudiced in their ability to recover administrative costs under section 7430.
Id.
68. Florida Country Clubs, Inc. v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 73, 84 (2004).
The first factor we rely upon to find that Congress specifically rejected adding the 30-
day letter to the definition of "position" in section 7430 is that Congress failed to
amend subsection (c)(7) in RRA 1998 even though Congress amended subsection
(c)(2) to include within the definition of "reasonable administrative costs" those costs
incurred on or after the date on which the 30-day letter is sent.
Id.
69. Cooper v. United States, 60 F.3d 1529, 1530 (11 th Cir. 1995) (quoting Weiss v.
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Because section 7430 permits the IRS to take different positions at
the administrative level and the judicial level, the presiding court may
consider each position separately to determine whether each is
substantially justified.70  Thus, the IRS may assert one position in its
notice of deficiency and then assert a different position in its answer to
the taxpayer's Tax Court petition or claim for refund.7" But, in Tax
Court, to the extent the IRS raises new issues, increases the asserted
deficiency or raises affirmative defenses in the Service's answer, the
IRS bears the burden of proof.72 Section 7430's regulations also permit
the IRS position to be substantially justified "in part" with respect to
certain issues, or a with respect to a "portion" of the proceedings and not
to another part or portion.73 The ability of the IRS to change its position
at various stages of a taxpayer controversy diminishes section 7430's
utility to taxpayers and weakens Congress' intended purpose of pre-
venting IRS overreaching and encouraging settlement.
Although section 7430's substantial justification standard requires
revisions to align it with Congress' statutory intent to curb improper
practices and positions by the IRS, the Reform Act's shifting of the
burden of proof regarding substantial justification was a significant
taxpayer friendly change.74  However, section 7430's substantial
justification standard requires revisions to align it with Congress'
Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1036, 1041 (1987)); Huffman v. Comm'r, 978 F.2d 1139, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1992); Zinniel v. Comm'r, 883 F.2d 1350, 1360 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Testimony of
Arthur Andersen & Co., 832 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1987); Weiss, 88 T.C. at 1041
(citing H.R. REP. No. 97-404, at 11 (1981)).
70. Huffman, 978 F.2d 1139; Clair v. United States, 978 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1992);
W&S Distributing, Inc. v. United States, 78 A.F.T.R.2d 96-6013 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
71. Id.
72. TAX CT. R. 142(a)(1).
73. tcas. Reg. ka§ a3.70n(ucu III eYd1 ).
If the position of the Internal Revenue Service was substantially justified with respect
to some issues in the proceeding and not substantially justified with respect to the
remaining issues, any award of reasonable administrative costs to the taxpayer may be
limited to only reasonable administrative costs attributable to those issues with respect
to which the position of the Internal Revenue Service was not substantially justified.
If the position of the Internal Revenue Service was substantially justified for only a
portion of the period of the proceeding and not substantially justified for the
remaining portion of the proceeding, any award of reasonable administrative costs to
the taxpayer may be limited to only reasonable administrative costs attributable to that
portion during which the position of the Internal Revenue Service was not
substantially justified.
Id.
74. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(B)(i) (2006).
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statutory interest to curb improper practices and positions by the IRS.
As discussed above, section 7430 currently requires the IRS to prove
that its position is substantially justified to avoid an award of fees to the
taxpayer. However, prior to the Reform Act, taxpayers were saddled
with the burden of proving that the IRS' position was not substantially
justified; and prior to the 1986 amendments to section 7430, taxpayers
were required to satisfy an even more onerous standard-that the IRS
position was "unreasonable. 75
(b) Affluent Taxpayers Need Not Apply-
section 7430 's Net Worth Requirement
Section 7430 conditions a taxpayer's qualification as a prevailing
party on the taxpayer satisfying a statutory net worth requirement.76
Section 7430 contains the same net worth requirements as the EAJA.77
Administrative and litigation costs awards are unavailable to an
individual or estate when their net worth exceeds $2,000,000;
corporations, partnerships, or unincorporated businesses whose net
75. Richard L. Schmalbeck & Gary Myers, A Policy Analysis of Fee-Shifting Rules
under the Internal Revenue Code, 1986 DUKE L.J. 970, 984-86 (1986).
Prior to the 1986 amendments, in order to be eligible for reimbursement of fees under
section 7430, a taxpayer had to establish that the government's position was
unreasonable. In contrast, under the amended provisions, the taxpayer must show
only that the government's position was not "substantially justified." One might
assume that there is little difference between the two standards. After all, each phrase
can be defined in terms of the other: a reasonable position is one that is substantially
justified; a substantially justified position is a reasonable one . . . . Despite these
similarities, there may be a small difference in meaning between the two terms. There
may be cases in which it would be reasonable to proceed with a position that has some
justification, though that justification might not rise to a level where it could be said to
be substantial .... Several courts have held correctly that "substantial justification"
means more than merely reasonable ....
Id.; see also James A. McQueen, Tax Litigation and Attorney's Fees: Still A Win-Lose
Dichotomy, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 471, 471-84 (1984).
While section 7430 may appear to signal a movement away from the rejection by the
American Rule of fee shifting between litigants, the section is more in accord with the
American Rule than it may seem, for it will in fact only rarely result in the awarding
of attorney's fees . . . . The main obstacle taxpayers face in order to recover
attorney's fees is establishing that "the position of the United States was
*.. unreasonable.
Id.
76. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D) (2006).
77. See id. § 7430(c)(4)(A) (cross-referencing the net worth requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d), a provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act).
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worth exceeds $7,000,000; and businesses employing more than 500
employees, regardless of the net worth of that business.78 Individuals
who file a joint return are treated as separate individuals for the purposes
of the net worth requirement. 79 The result of this rule is a net worth
limitation of $4,000,000 for individuals who file a joint return, or
$2,000,000 per taxpayer.80 When a taxpayer's net worth exceeds the
statutory thresholds, the taxpayer is also disqualified from being deemed
a prevailing party under the qualified offer rules discussed in greater
detail below.8
Charitable organizations are exempt from section 7430's net worth
limitations. Charitable organizations are not, however, exempt from the
employee limitation. Thus, charitable organizations with more than 500
employees are not eligible for awards of attorneys' fees.82  Section
7430's net worth provisions, like several other section 7430 provisions,
are incongruent with the purpose of protecting taxpayers from IRS
overreaching. Section 7430 ignores that pursuing "test cases" against
high net worth taxpayers is often more cost effective for the IRS than
challenging positions taken by taxpayers to whom section 7430's
protections would be available. Nonetheless, when the incentive for
capricious IRS challenges to taxpayer positions is greatest, section 7430
leaves high net worth taxpayers defenseless against improper IRS
pursuits.
(c) "Exhausting" Administrative Remedies
Section 7430 also requires taxpayers to exhaust all available
administrative remedies within the Internal Revenue Service to qualify
78. Id. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(i); Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-5(a) (as amended in 1997)
(concri ng -lll udl. insll ttiv ot s' J~ ).
79. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(D)(ii) (2006).
80. S. REP. No. 105-33, at 304; Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997); see Hong
v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 88 (1993) (holding that husband and wife were each entitled to
costs since, although together the spouses had a combined net worth of over
$2,000,000, each had an individual net worth of less than $2,000,000); see also Prager
v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 524 (1994) (holding that where joint-filing spouses
brought a joint Tax Court petition and motion for fees and only one spouse meets the
financial eligibility requirements, the other spouse's right to an award of fees will not be
eliminated, but the spouse will be limited to an award of only those fees allocable to
that spouse).
81. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(E)(i) (2006).
82. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-5(0(3) (as amended in 1997).
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for an award of litigation costs.83 The taxpayer's failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies will constitute a forfeiture of the taxpayer's
right to an award of litigation costs.8 4 A taxpayer's refusal to grant the
IRS an extension of time within which to assess any tax does not
constitute a failure by the taxpayer to exhaust all administrative
remedies.85
Treasury regulations provide that a taxpayer has not exhausted all
administrative remedies with respect to a tax matter86 unless the party
participates in an Appeals Office conference prior to filing a petition in
the Tax Court, or prior to filing an action for refund in federal district
court or the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.8 7 Although this requirement
seems simple to satisfy, taxpayers must be careful to sufficiently
"participate" in the Appeals Office conference. Merely complying with
Appeals Office formalities will not suffice. Sufficient participation at
the Appeals Office conference requires that taxpayers disclose all
relevant information regarding the tax matter at issue "to the extent such
information and its relevance were known or should have been known to
the party or qualified representative at the time of such conference. ' 88
Requiring taxpayers to exhaust their administrative remedies is desirable
for the purposes of administrative efficiency. But the taxpayer's inad-
vertent failure to comply with the procedural requirement precludes the
taxpayer from recovering attorney's fees.
If the IRS did not grant the taxpayer an Appeals Office conference
before issuing the notice of deficiency, the taxpayer must have done
both of the following before the issuance of the notice of deficiency: (1)
requested the Appeals Office conference; and (2) filed a written protest,
if a written protest is required to obtain a conference.89
83. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1) (2006). See Wilfong v. United States, 991 F.2d 359 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the taxpayer must meet three requirements: he must show that
he exhausted all administrative remedies prior to commencing civil action, that he is a
prevailing party, and that the amount of the fee request is reasonable); see also In re
Lilly, 76 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that the apparent futility of exhausting
administrative remedies does not justify failure to so exhaust for the purposes of section
7430).
84. Kenlin Indus., Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 782 (4th Cir 1991).
85. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(1) (2006).
86. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b)(3) (as amended in 2003) (defining tax matter
as contemplated by section 7430).
87. Id. § 301.7430-1(b)(1)(i).
88. Id. § 301.7430-1(b)(2).
89. Id. § 301.7430-1(b)(1)(ii).
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If the prevailing party filed an action for refund, the party must
have requested the Appeals Office conference and filed the written
protest prior to the issuance of a notice of disallowance. 9° Taxpayers
that fail to comply with the foregoing procedures will not be eligible to
recover attorneys' fees for failure to exhaust their administrative
remedies.
The regulations describe other circumstances in which
administrative remedies will be deemed exhausted. For example, the
IRS may waive the requirement that the taxpayer pursue administrative
remedies by informing the taxpayer in writing that doing so is
unnecessary. 9' If the taxpayer does not receive a waiver letter from the
IRS, and files a petition with the Tax Court, the taxpayer will be deemed
to have exhausted his administrative remedies if, through no fault of his
own,92 the taxpayer did not receive a 30-day letter prior to receiving the
notice of deficiency,93 and the taxpayer agrees, if such a request is made,
to participate in an Appeals Office conference while the case is in
docketed status.
94
If the taxpayer chooses to pay the tax and file a civil action for
refund, section 7430's regulations provide three different scenarios in
which taxpayers will be deemed to have exhausted their administrative
remedies:
(1) the taxpayer participates in a conference with the Appeals Office
regarding the tax matter prior to the issuance of a notice of
deficiency regarding the same tax matter;95
(2) the taxpayer did not receive notice that an Appeals Office
90. Id.
91. See id. § 301.7430-1(f)(1).
92. Kaufman v. Egger, 758 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985) (the taxpayer will be deemed
to have exhausted administrative remedies when the notice of deficiency is sent to an
address where the taxpayer never lived, and the confusion was not caused by the
taxpayer).
93. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(0(2) (as amended in 2003).
94. See id. § 301.7430-1(0(4) (providing the circumstances under which admin-
istrative remedies will be deemed exhausted for those tax matters for which a claim for
refund has been filed and such tax matters involve sections 6703 (providing the penalty
rules under sections 6700, 6701, or 6702) or 6694 (actions involving the understatement
of the taxpayer's income tax liability by the income tax preparer) involving generally
those matters in which the taxpayer has paid a portion of a penalty pending
determinations regarding the tax matter at issue).
95. Id. § 301.7430-1(f)(3)(i).
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conference was available to him prior to the issuance of a notice of
disallowance, and the failure to receive the notice was not the
taxpayer's fault; 9 6 or
(3) the taxpayer did not receive written or oral notification that a
request for an Appeals Office conference had been granted within 6
months from the date that the taxpayer filed the claim for refund, and
the failure to receive notice was not the taxpayer's fault.
97
(d) A Taxpayer Cannot Unreasonably Protract Litigation
A taxpayer will not be treated as a prevailing party if the taxpayer
unreasonably protracted the administrative or judicial proceedings.9 8
But a taxpayer that unreasonably protracted only a portion of the
administrative proceeding, but not other portions of the administrative
proceeding, will be able to recover reasonable administrative costs for
the portion of the administrative proceeding he did not unreasonably
protract. 99  Neither the Code nor the treasury regulations provide
examples of or define "unreasonably protracting" administrative or
judicial proceedings, although there are various cases involving
examples of such causes. o
B. The New Qualified Offer Exception
The Reform Act introduced section 7430(c)(4)(E)'s "qualified
offer" exception to the prevailing party rule when the IRS position is
substantially justified. The qualified offer exception permits a taxpayer
to qualify as a prevailing party for the recovery of administrative and
litigation costs when the amount of the taxpayer's liability pursuant to a
judgment'o rendered in the proceeding 2 is less than the amount of tax
96. Id. § 301.7430-1(f)(3)(ii). This subsection notes that an example of the failure
of receipt of the notice that an Appeals Office conference is available includes the
taxpayer's failure to disclose requested information, or the failure by the taxpayer to
supply the district director or the service center having jurisdiction over the matter with
a current mailing address.
97. Id. § 301.7430-1(f)(3)(ii).
98. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(3) (2006).
99. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-2(d) (as amended in 2003).
100. See, e.g., Flagg v. United States, 53 A.F.T.R.2d 84-1321, at 9 (S.D. Iowa
1984) (holding that a taxpayer who substantially prevailed against the IRS in an audit
was not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees because the taxpayer failed to provide
certain required detailed records).
101. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-7(b)(3) (as amended in 2004), defines the "taxpayer's
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liability if the IRS had accepted the taxpayer's last qualified offer. The
qualified offer exception is not available to judgments issued pursuant to
a settlement.10 3 Nor does the exception apply to a proceeding in which
the tax liability is not contested. 104
A "qualified offer" is a written offer that:
(1) is made by the taxpayer to the government during the qualified
offer period;
(2) specifies the amount of the taxpayer's liability (determined
without regard to interest);
(3) is designated as a qualified offer at the time it is made; and
(4) remains open until the earliest of the date the offer is rejected, the
date the trial begins, or the 9 0 th day after the date the offer is
made. 105
The taxpayer's liability under the last qualified offer is the amount
by which the taxpayer's liability (assuming the IRS accepted the
taxpayer's last qualified offer)-including all of the adjustments that
were contested in the administrative or judicial proceeding when the
offer was made-exceeds the tax liability on the taxpayer's return.
°6
The administrative and litigation costs to which the taxpayer is entitled
under this exception are limited to:
(1) those incurred on or after the date of the last qualified offer;
(2) those which are attributable to the adjustments when the last
qualified offer was made; and
liability pursuant to the judgment" under this section as "the change in the taxpayer's
liability resulting from amounts contained in the judgment as a result of the court's
determinations, and amounts contained in settlements not included in the judgment, that
are attributable to all adjustments that were included in the last qualified offer compared
to the amount shown on the return or returns." Furthermore, the "taxpayer's liability
pursuant to the judgment" does not include any amounts that are not included in the last
qualified offer, without regard to any adjustments made after the last qualified offer or
interest, unless such interest is at issue in the administrative or court proceeding.
102. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(E)(i) (2006).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii) ("proceedings in which the amount of tax liability is not
an issue" include declaratory judgment proceedings, proceedings to enforce or quash a
summons, and actions to restrain disclosure under section 61 10(f)).
105. Id. § 7430(c)(4)(E).
106. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-7(b)(2) (as amended in 2004).
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(3) those that were also included in the court's judgment. 107
The taxpayer's liability under the last qualified offer shall only
account for interest if the taxpayer's entitlement to interest is an issue
contested in the administrative or court proceeding and is also one of the
adjustments included in the last qualified offer. 108
A taxpayer is entitled to the benefit of the qualified offer exception
only if two conditions are met: the taxpayer makes a qualified offer, or
a settlement offer, consistent with the requirements of section 7430(g);
and the IRS rejects the qualified offer, or fails to accept the taxpayer's
last qualified offer °9 by the date which is the earliest of:
(a) the date the offer is rejected (the date that a notice of
disallowance is issued);
(b) the date the trial begins; or
(c) the date which is the 90th day after the date the offer is made. 
110
Treasury regulations permit the taxpayer to extend the time that the
qualified offer remains open, the window within which the Service may
accept the qualified offer, if the extension is made prior to the expiration
of the normal period."'1 The taxpayer must make the qualified offer to
the government112 during the "qualified offer period" defined as
107. Id. § 301.7430-7(a). This regulation provides that the qualified offer rule is
also inapplicable to those reasonable administrative and litigation costs to which the
taxpayer might otherwise be entitled as a prevailing party under any other provision of
section 7430(c).
108. Id. § 301.7430-7(b)(2).
109. See I.R.C. § 7430-7(c)(4)(E)(iii)(I) (2006) (stating that the qualified offer with
which the amount of the judgment will be compared will be the last qualified offer by
the taxpayer regarding the tax liability at issue).
110. Id. § 7430-7(g)(1)(D).
111. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-7(c)(5) provides, however, that the extension of the
period for which the qualified offer remains open will not satisfy the minimum period
for a qualified offer remaining open as required by section 7430-7(c)(5) if the taxpayer
would not have satisfied the requirement without such extension.
t 12. Delivery Requirements for Qualified Offers Made to the United States, Treas.
Reg. § 301.7430-7(c)(2), provides that unless the qualified offer is mailed to an office
or personnel designated in this regulation, it shall be deemed not to have been mailed.
The date of the United States mail postmark shall be deemed the date of receipt by the
addressee. Section 7502(f)(1) shall apply regarding designated delivery services other
than the United States mail. A taxpayer has made a qualified offer to the United States
when such offer is delivered to the office or personnel within the Internal Revenue
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beginning on the date on which the first letter of proposed deficiency
(i.e., the 30-day letter) is sent to the taxpayer, 1 3 and ending on the date
30 days prior to the day on which the case is set for trial. 114 In refund
cases, the qualified offer period begins on the date that the notice of
disallowance is issued, unless there is no notice of claim disallowance.
In the latter case, the beginning of the qualified offer period will be the
date on which any responsive pleading is filed with the court."'
Although the regulations permit the IRS to accept the qualified offer
beyond the end of the qualified offer period, the regulations prohibit any
extension of the qualified offer period. 16 There can be no additional
time granted within which the taxpayer may make a qualified offer. But
the taxpayer may choose to grant the IRS additional time to accept the
last qualified offer made during the qualified offer period.
The taxpayer must designate his offer as a qualified offer at the
time it is made1 7 and must also include the amount that the taxpayer is
Service, Office of Appeals, Office of Chief Counsel, or the Department of Justice that
has jurisdiction over the matter at issue. The regulation provides further that if such
offices or persons are not known to the taxpayer making the offer, the taxpayer should
proceed as follows:
(A) If the taxpayer's initial pleading in a court proceeding has been answered, the
taxpayer may deliver the offer to the office that filed the answer. (B) If that
taxpayer's petition in the Tax Court has not been answered, the taxpayer may deliver
the offer to the Office of Chief Counsel, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington,
D.C. 20224. (C) If the taxpayer's initial pleading in any Federal Court, other than the
Tax Court, has not yet been answered, the taxpayer may deliver the offer to the
Attorney General of the United States, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington,
D.C. 20530-0001. For suit brought in a United States district court, a copy of the
offer should also be sent to the United States Attorney for the district in which the suit
is brought. (D) In any other situation, the taxpayer may deliver the offer to the office
that sent the taxpayer the first letter of proposed deficiency which allows the taxpayer
the opportunity for administrative review in the Internal Revenue Service Office of
Appeal.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-7(c)(2) (as amended in 2004).
113. I.R.C. § 7430(g)(2)(A) (2006).
114. Id. § 7430(g)(2)(B).
115. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-7(c)(7) (as amended in 2004) (A case in the Tax Court
or the federal courts is considered set for trial on the date scheduled for the calendar
call).
116. Id.
117. I.R.C. § 7430(g)(1)(C) (2006). Treas. Reg. § 301-7430-7(c)(4) (as amended in
2004) provides that although a taxpayer may designate an offer as a qualified offer, if
the taxpayer makes such an offer when there exists adjustments raised by the taxpayer
that are unresolved, it will not be deemed a qualified offer unless the taxpayer
contemporaneously or prior to making such offer, the taxpayer provides the United
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offering as his tax liability. The government's acceptance of the offer
will fully resolve the taxpayer's liability for the taxes and tax years
involved in the proceeding. 118 The amount of the qualified offer may be
either a specific dollar amount representing the full amount of the
taxpayer's qualified offer, or a percentage of the adjustments determined
at the time the offer is made." 9 If all of the requirements regarding
qualified offers are satisfied, the IRS cannot assert that its position is
substantially justified.
IV. THE ART OF MEASURING THE AWARD
A. Generally
The administrative and litigation costs that a prevailing party may
seek when the government's position in the proceeding 120 is not
substantially justified include the imposition of:
(1) attorneys' fees limited to a statutorily-imposed maximum
adjusted annually for inflation;
(2) expert witness fees;
(3) court costs;
States "with the substantiation and legal and factual arguments necessary to allow for
informed consideration of the merits of those adjustments." For the purposes of this
section, satisfaction of the requirement of providing necessary substantiation and legal
and factual arguments participation by the taxpayer (or his qualified representative)
includes participating in either an Appeals office conference or an Area Counsel
conference, or conferring with the Department of Justice, and at such times disclosing
all relevant information, which includes, but is not limited to the legal and factual
arguments supporting the taxpayer's position in the adjustments at issue. The taxpayer
will be deemed to have disclosed all relevant information if the taxpayer has supplied
"sufficient information to allow informed consideration of the taxpayer's tax matter to
the extent the information and its relevance were known or should have been known to
the taxpayer at the time of the conference." Id.
118. See I.R.C. § 7430(g)(1)(B) (stating that the offered amount is determined
without regard to interest for the purposes of determining the amount of the qualified
offer amount unless the interest is an issue contested in the proceeding).
119. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-7(c)(3) (as amended in 2004).
120. I.R.C. § 7430(e) (2006) provides that actions which could have been joined or
consolidated, such as cases with returns of a single taxpayer that could have been joined
in a single court proceeding will be treated as a single court proceeding, whether or not
actually joined, for the purpose of determining the recoverable costs, unless the court
determines that to treat as such would be inappropriate.
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(4) the cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test or project
necessary for the preparation of the case, based on the " revailing
market rates for the kind or quality of services furnished";'
(5) administrative non-litigation costs or fees similar to those
charged by the IRS, under section 7430(c)(2)(A).
B. Administrative Costs
Administrative costs include only those incurred on or after the
earliest of: (a) the date of the taxpayer's receipt of the Appeals Office
notice; (b) the date of the notice of deficiency; or (c) the date on which
the IRS sends the first letter of proposed deficiency (30-day letter),
which allows the taxpayer the opportunity for administrative review in
the Appeals Office. 122
"Reasonable" administrative costs are those that are reasonable and
necessary amounts the taxpayer incurs to present the taxpayer's position
regarding the merits of the tax controversy or the recovery of
administrative costs.12 3 Further, "reasonable administrative costs" must
be reasonable in both nature and amount, and must have been incurred
after the administrative proceeding date. 
124
121. Id. § 7430(c)(1)(B). Treas. Reg. 301.7430-4(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1997)
provides that prevailing market rates for representatives may be established by affidavit,
and costs for expert witnesses regarding the prevailing market rates of representatives
are generally not reasonable administrative costs.
122. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(2) (2006). The addition of administrative costs beginning
with the letter of proposed deficiency, enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, reflects Congress' belief that the taxpayer
should be allowed to recover reasonable costs from the first point at which the I.R.S.
takes a position that is not substantially justified by issuing a proposed letter of
deficiency. See H.R. REP. No. 105-364, at 58; Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685
(1998). However, administrative costs are not recoverable from the IRS unless the
Service later takes a position in the notice of deficiency or an Appeals Office decision.
Florida Country Clubs, Inc. v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 73 (2004), affd, 404 F.3d 1291 (1 1th
Cir. 2005). Thus, although the taxpayer must seek an Appeals Office Conference to be
deemed to have exhausted the taxpayer's administrative remedies and thus be eligible
for an awards of costs, the taxpayer will not be eligible for awards of costs as to any
issues to which the taxpayer settles, as the IRS will be deemed never to have taken a
position although a proposed letter of deficiency was issued. Those administrative costs
incurred after the proposed letter of deficiency are not recoverable as to any portion of
that period before January 19, 1999.
123. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(1) (as amended in 1997).
124. Id. § 301.7430-4(c)(2). This regulation provides a thorough, but not exhaus-
tive, list of the types of costs eligible for the award of reasonable administrative costs.
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C. Litigation Costs
Litigation costs are distinct from administrative costs because they
are not incurred in connection with an administrative proceeding.
25
Litigation costs include those costs incurred both: (1) in connection
with preparing and filing a petition with the Tax Court or the
commencement of any other court proceeding; 26 and (2) after filing a
petition with the Tax Court or after the commencement of any other
court proceeding. 1
27
In Nofl v. United States, '28 the court denied the taxpayer's claim
for litigation costs (i.e., attorneys fees) incurred in administrative
proceedings before the IRS. The court disagreed with the taxpayer's
contention that such fees were properly characterized as litigation costs
because they were incurred in contemplation of litigation, which the
taxpayer subsequently initiated. 2 9 Thus, the attorneys' fees the Nofl
taxpayer incurred did not constitute litigation costs because they were
incurred before the filing of the complaint. Nor did these costs qualify as
administrative costs because they were incurred before the Appeals
Office issued its decision and before sending a notice of deficiency. 30
The Reform Act, however, now permits the No/l taxpayer's costs to
qualify as administrative costs even if taxpayer incurred them before an
Appeals Office decision or the issuance of a notice of deficiency.
Furthermore, the Tax Court indicated that the treasury regulations
applicable to administrative costs, particularly Treas. Reg. §301.7430-4
The regulation provides the following examples:
[C]osts normally included in the hourly rate of the representative [as determined] by
the custom and usage of the representative's profession, when billed separately, are
not recoverable separate and apart from the representative's hourly rate. Such costs
typically include costs such as secretarial and overhead expenses. In contrast, costs
that are normally billed separately may be reasonable administrative costs that may be
recoverable in addition to the representative's hourly rate. Therefore, necessary costs
incurred for travel; expedited mail delivery; messenger service; expenses while on
travel; long distance telephone calls; and necessary copying fees imposed by the
Internal Revenue Service, any court, bank or other third party, when normally billed
separately form the representative's hourly rate, may be reasonable administrative
costs.
Id.
125. Id. § 301.7430-4(c)(3).
126. Id. § 301.7430-4(c)(3)(i).
127. Id. § 301.7430-4(c)(3)(ii).
128. 933 F.3d 878 (3d Cir. 1993).
129. Id.
130. Id.
I.R.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
("Reasonable Administrative Costs"), also clearly apply to litigation
costs. 131
D. Attorney Fees Are Not Just for "Attorneys"
(1) Attorney-Defined
Section 7430(c)(3) defines attorneys' fees as fees for the services of
an individual-whether or not an attorney-who is authorized to practice
before the Tax Court or before the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, the
statute treats fees accountants and enrolled agents charge as attorneys'
fees subject to the same statutory limitations imposed on fees charged by
attorneys. 132
(2) Specially Qualified Representatives-A Special Factor
Treasury Regulation §301.7430-4(b)(2) expands the definition of
persons included in section 7430(c)(3) pertaining to attorneys' fees by
using the terms "representative" and "specially qualified representative."
The distinction between these two types of representatives is important
because the regulations expressly provide that the limited availability of
"specially qualified representatives" is a special factor justifying an
increase in the maximum rate included in an attorneys' fees award.
There is, however, no such statement in the regulations regarding
"representatives," and the judicial authorities rarely considered the
limited availability of "representatives" as a special factor justifying an
increase in the maximum hourly rate. 133  A specially qualified
representative is a representative possessing a distinctive knowledge or
unique and special skill that is necessary to adequately represent the
taxpayer in the proceeding. 34 Examples of such skill and knowledge
include an identifiable practice specialty in patent or international law.
The regulations, however, expressly exclude knowledge of, or
experience practicing tax law as the distinctive class of knowledge or
skill that is contemplated by the statute. 135
131. Cozean v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 227 (1997).
132. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(3) (2006).
133. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(2)(iii)(B) (as amended in 1997).
134. See id. § 301.7430-4(b)(2)(ii).
135. Id. The term "specially qualified representative" does not include those who
have a distinctive knowledge of the underlying subject matter of the controversy in
2010
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(3) Attorneys' Fees Paid or Incurred
Generally, only those attorneys' fees actually paid or incurred are
eligible for consideration for an award of costs. The taxpayer must
show that he paid such fees or incurred an obligation to pay them. Thus,
a taxpayer may not recover those attorneys' fees that are not billed or
those which may have been incurred on the taxpayer's behalf, but which
the taxpayer has no personal obligation to pay.136 The pro se taxpayer
will not be allowed to recover "lost opportunity costs" such as wages or
other remuneration lost during the time that he conducted his case, 137 the
value of the taxpayer's time spent preparing and participating in the
administrative and litigation proceedings (i.e., in addition to any
attorneys' fees to which he may be entitled as a pro se taxpayer), 38 or
circumstances where such distinctive knowledge could be supplied through the use of
an expert, or could reasonably be obtained through literature pertaining to the subject.
136. See Swanson v. Comm'r, 106 T.C. 76 (1996) (holding that the taxpayer was not
entitled to litigation costs when the taxpayer had not paid for legal services and the
future payment of which was contingent upon, and measured by the extent to which the
taxpayer prevailed in litigation, did not qualify as an obligation to pay the fees, and thus
no litigation costs allocable to attorneys' fees were awarded); Foothill Ranch Co. v.
Comm'r, 110 T.C. 94 (1998) (holding that a first-tier partner was only entitled to an
award of litigation costs to the extent that the partner had been allocated such costs on
the partnership's books pursuant to the partnership agreement); see also Grigoraci v.
Comm'r, 122 T.C. 272 (2004) (noting that the taxpayer, CEO/partner of an accounting
firm was not allowed an award of attorneys' fees for services rendered by the
partnership's personnel because the CEO/partner, despite his representation that he
would promptly reimburse the partnership with any funds the IRS awarded to him,
failed to show that he was legally obligated, or expected, to pay the invoiced amounts of
fees); Kruse v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1980 (1999) (holding that fees not be
awarded because they were paid by taxpayer's husband's employers' benefits plan);
McCormack v. United States, 83 A.F.T.R.2d 99-520 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (the court
awarded attorneys' fees and other litigation costs to taxpayer incurred during her refund
claim although her employer actually paid the fees); Thompson v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1036 (1996) (holding that when, with respect to deficiencies that were asserted
against taxpayer and her husband, same counsel was retained by taxpayer and her
husband, the court did not award fees, reasoning that taxpayer never intended to incur
or pay the fees when, regarding the check which taxpayer wrote to her husband to
reimburse him, (1) a summary of the taxpayer's assets showed that she lacked the funds
from which to draw the amount of the check, (2) the check was written after the court
requested stipulated facts concerning whether the taxpayer had paid or incurred the fees,
and (3) the check was dated two days after she gave a sworn affidavit stating that she
had in fact paid or incurred the fees and costs).
137. Petito v. Comrnm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 488 (2002).
138. Tkac v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2002-53 (2002).
2R.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
the value of his research time 3 9 as reasonable litigation costs.
Furthermore, an attorney representing himself or his law firm may not
recover fees or costs for such representation, unless the relationship
between the law firm and the attorney is so attenuated as to be
inconsequential. 140
(4) Pro Bono Services
Section 7430(c)(3)(B) permits fee awards in excess of the
attorneys' fees the taxpayer actually paid or incurred if the fees are less
than reasonable attorneys' fees because the individual is representing the
prevailing party for a nominal fee or no fee. This exception applies only
if the award is paid to the individual or the individual's employer who
provided the pro bono services. 141
(5) Statutory Fee Cap
Attorneys' fee awards are:
(1) based on prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of
services;
142an
(2) calculated exclusive of interest; and
143(3) subject to a statutory cap.
Section 7430 fee awards for administrative or litigation costs are
subject to a maximum hourly rate as authorized by the Internal Revenue
139. Dunaway v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 80 (2005).
140. See Estate of Cervin v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2282 (1998), aff'd, 200
F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the attorney who was a beneficiary and personal
representative of the petitioning estate had a small minority interest in the law firm
representing the estate and was thus entitled to recover litigation costs for the services
he performed on behalf of the law firm); see also Mair, Caniel & Kovach, P.S. v.
United States, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 5946 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (holding that an attorney who
had a substantial equity interest in his law firm did not represent himself because the
law firm engaged him in his individual capacity and paid him outside of his
compensation as a firm member, which seems to be a broader holding than the Tax
Court's in Estate of Cervin).
141. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(3)(B) (2006).
142. Miller v. Alamo, 992 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1993).
143. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(iii) (2006).
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Code. This maximum hourly rate is adjusted annually 144 to account for
inflation. The maximum hourly rate is $180 for fees paid or incurred in
2009 before accounting for any special factors. 145
The Tax Court held that when a taxpayer was billed both an hourly
fee and a flat fee for the balance of the services rendered, the hourly
billings were not limited by the statutory maximum because the average
hourly rate, as calculated with both the flat fee and the separate hours,
was less than the statutory rate. 146  Treasury regulations provide that
costs normally included in the hourly rates of a taxpayer's representative
according to custom and usage is not separate from the hourly rate even
when billed separately. 147 Thus, because overhead and secretarial fees
traditionally are included as part of attorneys' hourly fees, they are not
recoverable as part of attorneys' fees in calculating reasonable
administrative and litigation fees. Necessary costs incurred for travel,
expedited mail delivery, messenger service, expenses while traveling,
long distance telephone calls, and necessary copying fees either the IRS,
any court, bank or other third party imposes, when normally billed
separately form the representative's hourly rate, may be reasonable
costs. 148 Several courts have held that various miscellaneous costs are
separately recoverable as administrative and litigation costs. 149
144. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1997).
145. Rev. Proc. 3-38, 2008-66 I.R.B. 1107.
146. Estate of Russell v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 978 (1998).
147. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(c)(2) (as amended in 1997).
148. Id. See Buck v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1743 (1993) (holding that costs
claimed by a taxpayer that represented himself was not entitled to separately awardable
litigation costs for mileage, parking, medical bills, and his life insurance policy).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Sam Ellis Stores, Inc., No. 91-55969, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33370 (9th Cir. 1992), aJfg 768 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that
electronic research is a normal litigation expense); see, e.g., Powers v. Comm'r, 100
T.C. 457 (1993) (allowing expenses incurred for LEXIS as separate expenses, separate
expenses for certified copies and telecopy expenses, and allowing minimal mileage fees
as separately recoverable litigation expenses; but disallowing word processing expenses
reasoning that such expenses have traditionally been treated as general secretarial
expenses, which are included as overheard in attorneys' hourly fees); Han v. Comm'r,
66 T.C.M. (CCH) 499 (1993) (allowing expenses incurred for Westlaw research,
reasonable costs for law clerks, paralegal expenses, accounting services, and staff
overtime expenses, and also allowing separate awards for reasonable costs for minimal
parking costs for the taxpayer's attorney, messenger services, unspecified telephone
costs, and the costs for local transportation of the taxpayer's attorneys); Nolfi v. United
States, 70 A.F.T.R.2d 92-5604 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (disallowing separate expenses for
computerized legal research because the court considered such costs to be part of the
LR.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
Although the majority of these cases occurred before promulgation of
current treasury regulations under section 7430, the jurisprudence
considered collectively reflects the distinction characterized in the
regulations as either: (a) attorney overhead expenses, which are deemed
included in attorney's hourly rates; (b) other expenses typically included
in an attorneys' fees; or (c) expenses that an attorney usually charges
separately. 5 0
(6) Special Factor Adjustments
Generally, attorneys' fees are not awarded under section 7430 in an
amount greater than the statutory maximum unless a higher rate is
justified by a special factor,' 5' including:
attorney's hourly fee; disallowing messenger services as a fee separate from attorneys'
fees; disallowing travel expenses and the cost of staff overtime reasoning that they are
more properly characterized as part of the attorney's overhead expenses; disallowing
separate fees for long distance telephone calls and telecopies); McConaughy v. United
States, 833 F. Supp. 534 (D. Md. 1993), aff'd, 74 A.F.T.R.2d 5931 (4th Cir. 1994)
(paralegal fees, parking expenses incurred by taxpayer's attorneys, phone call and
facsimile expenses are included in attorney's overhead and are not separately
recoverable; allowing messenger fees as separately recoverable costs litigation costs);
Huffman v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2237 (1994) (allowing separately recoverable
charges for paralegal fees, copying charges, mailing expenses, long-distance telephone
calls); Wade v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 216 (D.N.J. 1994) (copying charges are
separately awardable litigation costs, mailing costs and travel costs are also separately
recoverable litigation costs because they are inevitable in any litigation). See, e.g.,
Buck v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1743 (1993) (allowing separate awards of mailing
expenses, couriers charges, and copying charges); Mullins v. United States, 95
A.F.T.R.2d 2005-1612 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (allowing separately recoverable costs for
mailing costs, copying costs and accountant time, but law clerk time was not a
separately allowable litigation expense); McWilliams v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH)
2107 (1995) (New Mexico state gross receipts tax on attorney fees is part of attorney's
overhead cost and is not separately recoverable); Buchanan v. United States, 765 F.
Supp. 642 (D. Or. 1991) (paralegal, law clerk, and legal assistant fees are separately
recoverable fees); O'Bryon v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 859 (2000) (reasonable costs
for paralegal are recoverable); Concerned Care, Inc. v. United States, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 97-
7569 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (paralegal fees were recoverable separate from attorneys' fees);
K.S. Fin. Group, Inc. v. Schulman, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-5282 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding
that computerized legal expenses are considered part a of attorney's hourly fees).
150. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4 (as amended in 1997).
151. The current treatment of "special factors" applies to all costs incurred more
than 180 days after the July 22, 1998, effective date of the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Prior to the Reform Act, the Internal Revenue
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(1) the limited availability of qualified attorneys for such
proceedings;
(2) the difficulty of the issues presented in the case; and
(3) the local availability of tax expertise. 152
For the purposes of demonstrating the limited availability of a
specially qualified representative, the taxpayer must show that a
specially qualified representative is not available at the statutory rate. 
1 53
Treasury regulations explicitly exclude the following1 54 from the
"special factors" justifying an award of attorneys' fees greater than the
statutory maximum: 
155
" undesirability of the case;
" work and the ability of counsel;
" results obtained;
" customary fees and awards in other cases; and
" the limited availability of specially qualified representatives.
Code did not define special factors further than stating that the limited availability of
specialized attorneys would qualify as a special factor. Under the pre-Reform Act
statutory standard the Tax Court stated: "[In order for the "limited availability of
qualified attorneys' to constitute a special factor warranting departure from the
[statutory] cap, there must be a limited availability of attorneys who possess distinctive
knowledge or a specialized skill needful to the particular litigation in question." Cozean
v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 227, 232 (1997).
152. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
153. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(3)(iii)(C) (as amended in 1997). Initially this
showing may be made by submitting an affidavit demonstrating that a specially
qualified representative that practices within a reasonable distance from the taxpayer's
principal residence or principal office would normally charge a client similar to the
taxpayer at a rate in excess of this amount.
154. There is an apparent conflict between section 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) and Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7430-4(b)(3)(iii)(B) on the issue of whether "difficulty of the issues presented" is
a special factor warranting an enhancement of attorneys' fees. The conflict arises
because the regulation was promulgated before the Reform Act in 1998 expanded the
definition of special factors to add "the difficulty'of the issues presented in the case."
See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3101(a)(2), 112 Stat. 685 (1998). Thus, contrary to the cited regulation and
Cozean v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 227 (1997), the difficulty of the issues presented may be a
special factor that justifies a higher attorney's fee award.
155. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(3)(iii)(B) (as amended in 1997).
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The Tax Court has not usually enhanced attorneys' fees above the
statutory maximum rate unless the taxpayer demonstrated that the
attorney who obtained exceptional results had distinctive knowledge or
special skill apart from being a tax practitioner. In such cases, the Tax
Court required the taxpayer to show that the exceptional results were
attributable to the special skill or knowledge that the attorney
possessed. 56 Furthermore, in Dang v. Commissioner... the Tax Court
held that "applying post-1998 tax law, tax expertise is not a special
factor."
Although the Tax Court does not appear to have ever enhanced an
award of attorneys' fees due to "special factors," Congress' inclusion in
section 7430 of special factors for courts to consider could be
characterized as an express rejection of the Tax Court's refusal to
consider the skill of the tax practitioner and the prevailing geographical
market rates for the tax practitioner's services. Notably, numerous
courts have concluded that tax law expertise alone, even when the
attorney holds an LL.M. in Taxation,' is not a special factor justifying
an enhanced award of attorneys' fees. Several courts reasoned that
because section 7430 pertains exclusively to tax cases, treating tax
expertise as a special factor would result in the exception swallowing the
rule, because most attorneys seeking attorneys' fees in tax litigation
possess expertise in tax law.
Decisions of federal courts indicate an approach to enhancing
attorneys' fees awards that is more liberal than the Tax Court. Some
district courts 5 9 and the Ninth Circuit 160 have held that tax expertise was
156. The Tax Court has held that for the limited availability of qualified attorneys to
constitute a special factor, there must be a limited availability of attorneys possessing
the distinctive knowledge or specialized skill that is required by the particular
litigation, rather than merely an extraordinary level of general lawyerly knowledge.
Cozean v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 227, 232 (1997).
157. Dang v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 544 (2002).
158. In Kenagy v. United States, 72 A.F.T.R.2d 93-5689 (W.D. Mo. 1993), the
district court held that the taxpayer's attorney who had an LL.M. in Taxation, and who
was a professor of tax law did not possess the skill or distinctive knowledge
contemplated by the statue, thus an enhanced award of attorneys' fees was not justified.
However, in Curell v. United States, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-6682 (S.D. Ohio 2001), the
district court held that an attorney's LL.M. in Taxation and his specialized expertise
justified a higher rate. See Urell v. United States, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-6682 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (exemplifying a scenario where the IRS did not acquiesce to the district court
position in Curell that an LL.M. in Taxation justifies a higher-than-statutory rate.)
159. See Long Pontiac Co. v. United States, 78 A.F.T.R.2d 96-5807 (E.D. Tenn.
2010
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a special factor justifying an enhancement in the attorneys' fees award.
There is disparity among appellate courts regarding those factors
warranting an enhancement of attorneys' fees. One district court
opinion 6' noted that the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Pierce v. Underwood162 as
permitting enhancement in situations in which an attorney has special-
ized expertise in a particular area of law. The District of Columbia,
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have interpreted Pierce as permitting fee
enhancement only when attorneys have a specialty that requires
expertise or education other than in the field of law. 163
Section 7430(c)(1)(B) authorizes a taxpayer to recover reasonable
expenses incurred for expert witnesses, as determined by prevailing
market rates, for a court proceeding.164 Nonetheless, a taxpayer may not
receive an award for reasonable costs expended for experts that exceeds
the highest rate of compensation for an expert witness the government
retained.
65
1996) (awarding higher than the statutory rate for attorneys' fees for an attorney with
tax expertise, but only for the work done at the administrative level, reasoning that it is
at the administrative level that the issues are sharpened for consideration at the district
court level, and any competent litigator can handle the tax issues at the district court
level); Franz v. United States, 73 A.F.T.R.2d 94-1485 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that the
special expertise of the attorney regarding the 100% responsible person party was
knowledge qualifying as a special factor in tax litigation); Blasberg v. United States, 81
A.F.T.R.2d 98-2412 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that the an attorney's special knowledge
and experience in litigating federal tax matters should justify an upward departure from
the statutory rate).
160. See United States v. Sam Ellis Stores, Inc., 981 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'g
768 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (affirming an enhancement of the statutory rate under
section 7430 when the attorney was a state bar certified tax specialist and a CPA and
the issues involved complex currency devaluation issues, however, the court held that
although the government failed to prevail their position was substantially justified, and
thus, the tax did not receive any award of attorneys' fees).
161. United States v. Scheingold, 293 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D.N.J. 2003).
162. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (holding that the exception to the
statutory fee limit for attorneys' fees in this case of special factors "refers to attorneys
having some distinctive or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question-as
opposed to an extraordinary level of the generally lawyerly knowledge and ability
useful in all litigation").
163. Scheingold, 293 F. Supp. 2d 447.
164. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B) (2006).
165. Id.
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(7) Special Considerations for Accountants and Enrolled Agents
Awards of attorneys' fees are available to certified public
accountants and enrolled agents authorized to practice before the
Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court. Such fees are also subject
to the same limitations on maximum hourly fees at which attorneys' fees
may be awarded. 166 The Tax Court, however, has held that fees paid to
individuals who are not authorized to practice before the Tax Court are
reimbursable as reasonable litigation costs only if the services provided:
(1) related to the legal aspects of the taxpayer's litigation; and (2) were
carried out under the direction or employ of an individual-whether or
not an attorney-who is authorized to practice before the Tax Court. 167
In McWilliams v. Commissioner, the Tax Court further restricted
the availability of attorneys' fees awards for the services of non-
attorneys. 168 In McWilliams the court held that fees the taxpayer paid to
an accountant were not reasonable because: (1) the taxpayer also had
two attorneys (one of whom was a CPA) working on his case, and the
billing summary for accounting services was vague and non-descriptive;
and (2) there were entries in the accountant's billing summaries referring
to discussions with attorneys that had no corresponding entries in the
attorney's billing summaries. 1
69
In Cozean v. Commissioner, however, the Tax Court awarded
attorneys' fees to the taxpayer for fees paid to accountants certified to
practice before both the IRS and the Tax Court even though counsel also
represented the taxpayer. 170
V. APPLICATION PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Generally
The recovery of attorneys' fees, litigation and administrative costs
is available in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of
any tax imposed under the Internal Revenue Code. Although section
7430 provides subject matter jurisdiction over requests for adminis-
166. Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-4(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1997); Cozean v. Comm'r,
109 T.C. 227 (1997).
167. Guyan Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 433 (1988).
168. McWilliams v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2107 (1995).
169. Id.
170. Cozean, 109 T.C. 227.
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trative and litigation costs with the Tax Court, Court of Federal Claims,
and the federal district courts, in those cases in which the substantive tax
issues have been resolved at the administrative level, subject matter
jurisdiction over the taxpayer's requests for an award of costs rests
exclusively with the Tax Court.
B. Application and Judicial Proceeding for Administrative Costs
A prevailing party seeking an award of administrative costs under
section 7430(c)(2) must file an application with the IRS before the 91st
day after the date on which the final decision of the IRS as to the
determination of the tax, interest, or penalty is mailed to him. 71 The
Tax Court has jurisdiction to decide taxpayer appeals from IRS
decisions granting or denying (in whole or in party) awards for
reasonable administrative costs. 172 An action for administrative costs is
the commencement of a new case. Rather than being subject to the
procedural rules applicable to motions for litigation costs and adminis-
trative costs arising from a deficiency proceeding currently before the
Tax Court, a separate action for only administrative costs is instead
procedurally analogous to a small tax case. 173 Not all rules of small case
procedure are applicable, however. For example, answers must be filed
in all actions for awards of reasonable administrative costs. 174 The Tax
Court's disposition of a prevailing party's petition seeking an award of
administrative costs pursuant to section 7430(f)(2) is reviewable in the
same manner as a decision of the Tax Court.
175
C. Judicial Proceedings for Litigation and Administrative Costs
(1) Tax Court
A prevailing party may file a motion for litigation and
administrative costs in the Tax Court:
(1) within 30 days of the service of the opinion determining the
issues in the case;
171. I.R.C. § 7430(b)(4) (2006).
172. Id. § 7430(0(2); TAX CT. R. 270.
173. TAx CT. R. 230-33, 271-74.
174. Id. R. 232.
175. I.R.C. § 7430(0(3) (2006).
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(2) within 30 days from the service of the transcript that contains
findings in fact or an opinion stated orally (or a written summary of
the oral opinion); or
(3) after the parties have settled all issues in the case other than
litigation and administrative costs. 176
The IRS will file a written response to every motion for an award of
reasonable litigation or administrative costs.177 The response shall be
filed within 60 days after service of the motion.178
The disposition of a motion for reasonable administrative and
litigation costs must be included in the decision of the case. 179 This rule
is intended to simplify the appeal procedures by incorporating into a
single document the disposition of both the substantive issues of the case
and the motion for costs. Thus, the disposition of a motion for costs
may be appealed in the same manner as the judgment in the case.
Section 7430 also provides taxpayers with an automatic right to appeal
the Tax Court's unexplained summary denial of a motion for litigation
costs.
80
(2) U. S. District Court
Federal district courts are split along two lines regarding the
applicable period within which to seek litigation costs. One line holds
that the rule of the district courts (i.e., Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure) prescribes the period within which taxpayers must seek
litigation costs.' 8' The other line applies the 30-day rule of 28 U.S.C.
§2412(d)(1)(B) because it is the statute incorporated into section
7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) regarding applications for litigation costs. 82  One
176. See TAX CT. R. 231(a)(2). However, in Minahan v. Conm'r, 88 T.C. 516
(1987), the Tax Court permitted a taxpayer to submit an application for fees after the
entry of a stipulated decision. But, in Manchester Group & Subsidiaries v. Comm 'r, 68
T.C.M. (CCH) 1383 (1994), the court denied a motion for costs when the taxpayer filed
the motion to vacate and revise the decision so that the taxpayer could raise the issue of
litigation costs when the motion was filed four days after the 90-day period for
appealing the decision expired.
177. I.R.S. Manual § 35.10.1.1.1(6) (Aug. 11, 2004); TAX CT. R. 232.
178. TAX CT. R. 232(b).
179. Id. R. 232(f).
180. I.R.C. § 7430(f)(1) (2006).
181. Regimbal v. United States, 87 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-2571 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
182. Overton v. United States, 83 A.F.T.R.2d 99-493 (10th Cir. 1999); O'Banion v.
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district court explained this reasoning by stating that the federal district
court rule regarding the recovery of attorneys' fees does not apply in
section 7430 cases because (a) Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly states that the rule applies "unless otherwise
provided by statute" 8 3; and (b) section 7430 expressly incorporates the
30-day period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(1)(B). 8 4
D. "Fees for Fees" Litigation
"Fees for fees" litigation seeks to recover the fees incurred in the
preparation and submission of a request for the recovery of reasonable
litigation and administrative costs when a court has determined that the
IRS position was not substantially justified, and the taxpayer's recovery
of fees is justified.'85 Entitlement to "fees for fees" may not arise until
after the controversy as to the substantive tax issues has concluded
because the taxpayer may not make a motion to the court for the
recovery of fees until the court has rendered a decision. Significantly,
the taxpayer may remain eligible for the recovery of "fees for fees" even
when the taxpayer has failed to timely file for such fees.
8 6
United States, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5085 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Collins Music Co. v. United
States, 890 F. Supp. 465 (D.S.C. 1995); Reeves v. United States, 73 A.F.T.R.2d 94-
1261 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
183. FED. R. CW. P. 54(d).
184. O'Banion, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5085.
185. See, e.g., Huffman v. Comm'r, 978 F.2d 1139, 1148 (9th Cir. 1992) (the court
determined that the taxpayer was entitled to attorneys' fees in "fees for fees" litigation
when the IRS admitted that it had made a false declaration, thus the Tax Court awarded
fees to the taxpayer as the taxpayer would not have had to engage in litigation to resolve
issues that would not have been issues had the IRS not made a false declaration);
Regimbal v. United States, 87 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-2571 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
186. See Ragan v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 514, 518 (5th Cir. 2000). The court, in
granting a request for "fees for fees" that was submitted after the original fee request
had been considered, reasoned:
The IRS claims that Jackie is not entitled to seek these fees on remand because they
were not raised in the first appeal and thus not within the scope of the order on
remand. In her prior appeal, however, Jackie did request the right to submit a §7430
petition for "fees for fees" if our court ruled in her favor .... Clearly, prior cases
grant "fees for fees" when requested alongside the original fee petition. However, the
danger of infinite, but decreasing, fee request is more illusory than real. Attorneys
have sufficient motivation to request their fees up front whenever possible. Moreover,
such fees were explicitly within the scope of the remand order. Thus, we hold that
under these limited circumstances Jackie's request for "fees for fees" should not have
been considered untimely.
LR.C. § 7430 ATTORNEYS'FEES
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Reform Act provided several significant pro-taxpayer amend-
ments in light of the previous versions of section 7430. The most
significant legislative reforms included, increasing the hourly amount of
attorney fees, awarding reasonable administrative fees retroactive to the
initial 30-day letter, permitting the recovery of fees by pro bono
attorneys, and allowing taxpayers to submit qualified offers.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, section 7430 still fails to provide
taxpayers with real leverage in their negotiations with the IRS. Effective
functioning of the statute would require that the IRS weigh the conse-
quences of overreaching, and upon analyzing its position, the IRS would
determine, when appropriate, that the potential risk of asserting an
unjustified position outweighs the potential benefit of challenging a
taxpayer's position. However, because section 7430's limitations and
procedural burdens result only in anomalous awards of fees and costs,
7430 certainly falls short of amounting to an imposing factor demanding
the IRS's consideration in its challenges to taxpayer positions. The
perceived likelihood and potential size of an award of attorneys' fees
and costs to taxpayers must be great enough to: (1) prevent the IRS
from policy-making at the taxpayers' expense and (2) achieve Congress'
intent that 7430 serve as a deterrent to abusive IRS practices and IRS
overreaching. Section 7430 is currently failing on both fronts.
Congress should amend section 7430 to provide greater protections
for taxpayers from IRS overreaching. Specific protective measures
should include:
* fixing the time and manner in which the IRS would adopt its
"position" to preclude the IRS from changing its position as the
administrative proceeding evolves;
" increasing the specific net worth limitations for qualifying taxpayers;
" providing guidance in determining if the IRS position is substantially
justified;
" simplifying the qualified offer rules;
" and, most importantly, recognizing that special tax expertise (e.g.,
advanced taxation degrees, substantial experience in handling tax
controversies) is a sufficient factor to support a rate higher than the
minimum statutory rate for attorneys' fees.
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Implementing these measures will establish Internal Revenue Code
§ 7430 as the statute Congress intended: a shield for taxpayers who
have taken legitimate tax positions to protect against overreaching by the
behemoth Internal Revenue Service.
